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The Soviet Union has remained officially aloof from the course of events in Korea, although exploiting every opportunity to portray itself as the champion of "peace." Contrasted with this overt Soviet dissociation from the Korean war, intelligence indicates that Soviet men and materiel have been and are currently very much involved.

## THE SOVIET WORLD: REACTIONS TO THE MUTUAL SECURITY ACT

The Soviet Union has seized upon the Mutual Security Act as proof of the aggressive intentions of the United States and is exploiting it to substantiate its propaganda and the charges in the United Nations that the US threatens world peace. The significance attached by the Soviet Union to the forthcoming debate in the UN on these charges is indicated by the formal protest notes of all the European Satellites and the extensive press and radio publicity given to the Act throughout the Orbit.

Public admission in the Mutual Security Act that funds have been appropriated "for any selected persons who are residing in or escapees from the Soviet Union and its Satellites either to form such persons into elements of the military forces supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or for other purposes . ." is being used by the USSR as "proof" that its charges of US subversion and espionage in Eastern Europe are true.

Using the Act as a point of departure, Vyshinsky in the UN will probably attempt to justify Soviet claims that the US is interfering in the domestic affairs of other countries, to counter US complaints that the Soviet Satellites, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, have violated the 1947 Peace Treaties, and to combat the Yugoslav resolution in the UN charging Cominform subversive and espionage activities.

On 21 November, Moscow formally protested to the US that the Mutual Security Act constituted a violation of the US-Soviet treaty of 1933. On the following day the Kremlin demanded and subsequently received permission from the UN General Assembly for open full debate on its charges that the US had violated an international agreement. Since then each of the Satellites has issued individual notes enumerating aggressive American acts since World War II. In addition, Hungary and Rumania published lengthy declarations detailing alleged subversion and espionage by US representatives.

The Soviet and Satellite notes have been accompanied by voluminous propaganda, beamed primarily at Satellite audiences, linking various recent developments to the Mutual Security Act.

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Consideration of George Kennan as Ambassador to Moscow led to accusations against US diplomats, "long experienced in intelligence, sabotage and provocation."

Charges of aggressive Yugoslav intentions were also tied to the Act, with Yugoslavia being accused of spearheading many of the alleged American deeds in Eastern Europe. Radio Free Europe and prominent Satellite political refugees in the US are further targets of the present propaganda

The Act may be used to justify additional restrictions on US officials in Eastern Europe. This has been a continuing process during the past few years and has greatly reduced the staff and activities of US missions in Rumania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Imposition of further restrictions on the missions in Warsaw and Prague is possible and may hinge on the forthcoming trials of Wladyslaw Gomulka in Poland and Rudolf Slansky in Czechoslovakia. Slansky has already been accused of conspiring with a Western power and his activities have been cited as further proof of American "subversive and conspiratorial activities in the People's Democracies."

Another result may be tightened control over Eastern European nationals, with greater emphasis being placed upon the need for "increased vigilance" against internal and external enemies.

WORLD COMMUNISM: COMMUNIST MENACE TO BURMA AGGRAVATED

Most recent information from Burma indicates that the Communists have achieved important new successes toward consolidating insurgent elements, and now are in a position to exploit either the political or the military vulnerabilities of the government, whichever course seems best suited to developments in Southeast Asia.

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While it is unlikely that Rangoon will fall or that the government will be overthrown by purely military action in the immediate future, the insurgents appear now to be in a position to expand rapidly their military operations against the disorganized and poorly equipped Burmese army. Their augmented capabilities may stimulate increased Chinese aid, which could be a decisive factor in winning Communist control of the country.

Recent political developments are no more encouraging. The government not only continues complacent toward the Communist threat, but persistent reports have been received that the Burma Socialist Party is planning to remove the pro-Western members of the cabinet, including Premier Thakin Nu, when the new Socialist-dominated Parliament convenes in January. These reports indicate that U Ba Swe, the Marxist-inclined leader of the Socialist Party, is the leading candidate to replace Thakin Nu.

The latter has publicly denied these reports, apparently with authoritative backing from Socialist leaders, although the necessity of such action strongly suggests that the reports had considerable merit. Moreover, the Socialists are capable of removing Nu at any time, especially if the military tide continues to run against the government.

A regime led by U Ba Swe would be essentially unfriendly if not openly hostile to the US. In addition, it might cooperate with those Communists who are operating openly and effect a compromise with those in a state of insurgency. Much closer relations with Communist China and the USSR could also be anticipated.

In this connection, it is noteworthy that a November resolution of the World Peace Council recommending settlement of "active or latent" struggles in Southeast Asia by peaceful negotiation has been well received by the Burmese press. Should the Communists pursue such a policy, even the present regime would feel compelled to negotiate, while an administration headed by U Ba Swe would probably be willing to offer concessions which could lead to eventual Communist control.

## THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN CRISIS

Anglo-Egyptian relations have steadily worsened during the nine weeks since Egypt abrogated its 1936 treaty with Britain. Recent incidents in Egypt have heightened the tension there, and the Cairo government has recalled its Ambassador to London. With Egypt in an uncompromising mood, and with Britain standing firm on its treaty rights, the situation seems certain to deteriorate rather than to improve. Attempts to solve the Suez Canal issue by working out a formula on the Sudan question have not been successful.

From the military standpoint, Britain has considerably improved its already strong position in the Canal zone: an increase during the past two months to somewhat more than 50,000 men enables the British forces to handle any possible threat the Egyptian Army might pose. With British military control extended along the Canal, mercantile and military shipping has continued, at least during daylight hours. British forces control the movement of Egyptian troops and civilians between the Delta area and the Sinai Peninsula and can disrupt the Egyptian economy by limiting certain supplies, particularly the important oil shipments from Suez to Cairo.

British authorities in Egypt, however, have been faced with a number of difficult problems in the past several weeks. Nearly all of the 70,000 Egyptian laborers formerly employed in the British base at Fayid have departed. The British are now attempting to replace this labor with workers from Cyprus, Malta and Kenya. Egyptian terrorists, nationalists, and policemen have caused a series of incidents, making it difficult for British troops to maintain a passive role. There is always the danger that Egyptian bitterness toward the British troops may be subsequently directed against the some 27,000 British civilians in Egypt, if not against foreigners generally.

The problems facing the Wafd Government in Cairo, however, are also extremely serious. There is now substantial popular and even press criticism of the cabinet, particularly over the government's inability to force a British evacuation of the Canal area. Laborers formerly with the British forces are demanding jobs. The exodus of Egyptians from the Canal region and the confinement of British soldiers to their camps has resulted in a loss of trade. Commercial transactions with Britain, Egypt's chief customer have been hindered by dock strikes and nationalist demands for a general boycott of British goods. The lucrative tourist trade has also suffered a serious decline.

The Wafd Government has added to its own difficulties by making contradictory moves in its efforts to maintain public order. In an effort to thwart an expansion of terrorism or a possible increase of Communist activities, the Egyptian Government has initiated a variety of measures.

Public demonstrations have again been banned and terrorist actions denounced as "traitorous." Despite popular criticism, the government has put the "liberation battalions," composed of militant nationalists, under official control. King Farouk and the powerful Minister of Interior have even conferred with the Moslem Brotherhood leader in an effort to gain his support for limiting violence. While taking steps to curb public demonstrations, Egyptian officials have at the same time issued intemperate commiques against the British, thus encouraging further outbreaks of violence.

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With the worsening of the situation in Egypt, there has been considerable speculation over the possibility of a change of government which might bring a more moderate group of Egyptians to power. This is the current hope of the British Foreign Office. King Farouk himself is known to be contemplating an eventual change in the government, although he believes that the present time is not propitious.

It is doubtful, however, that a mere change in Cabinets would solve the present crisis. With nationalist sentiment thoroughly aroused, it is difficult to see how any government could survive if it publicly agreed to compromise on the Suez and Sudan issues.. If a new cabinet offers no change from Wafd foreign policy, the present deadlock is likely to persist, with the inevitable incidents between Egyptian nationalists and British troops. There is little indication, therefore, that a new government would be able 25X1 better to maintain order than the present cabinet.

Western hopes that the Middle East Command proposals might resolve the Anglo-Egyptian impasse were dashed by an abrupt refusal from Cairo, and have little chance for early realization. While certain Arab leaders have privately expressed their interest in the Western defense proposals, the forces opposing Arab acceptance of the plan are unusually strong. The Arab states are still unwilling to take a stand against Egypt and give their open support to the Western proposals. Furthermore, substantial anti-Western or at least neutralist sentiment in the area has made Arab leaders wary of taking a pro-Western stand.



The considerable Arab suspicions of Western intentions and the general Arab apathy to any threat from the USSR has presented fertile ground for Soviet propaganda which the USSR has been quick to exploit. While the recently increased Soviet diplomatic maneuvers have certainly not determined Arab foreign policy, they have at least had the effect of strengthening Arab caution against supporting either world bloc.

The closest Arab leaders have come to siding with the West has been to indicate that they will probably not oppose the Middle East Command, as did Egypt, and that they will attempt to keep the door open for a possible later agreement on the plan. Many of these officials have emphasized that the bitter Anglo-Egyptian dispute must first be solved before Arab acceptance of the Western defense proposals is possible.

## SWITZERLAND MAINTAINS ITS NEUTRALITY IN THE US-SOVIET CONFLICT

In the East-West struggle the Swiss have succeeded in maintaining the cardinal principle of their foreign policy -- neutrality. This has involved steering a careful diplomatic course in relations with both blocs. Switzerland has recognized Communist China and the West German Republic, but not the East German regime, and though not a member of the United Nations, it has joined non political specialized agencies of the UN such as FAO and UNESCO.

In the economic sphere, however, Switzerland has found it more difficult to pursue a middle course. Raw material shortages, intensified US demands for Swiss control of export and transshipment of strategic items, and the withholding of strategic items by the United States have forced the Swiss to compromise and partially to meet US objectives in these fields. Switzerland did not participate in the European Recovery Program, but has, with reservations, joined the affiliated Organization for European Economic Cooperation. The Swiss have resisted subordination of OEEC to NATO and have implied that if this is carried out they will withdraw from the organization. 25X1

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[REDACTED] The Swiss Foreign Minister recently expressed satisfaction that the question of East-West trade had been more or less satisfactorily settled for the time being by the reconciliation of American demands with "the Swiss need for supplies," and by the "acceptance of the Swiss position by the Eastern countries." Earlier this same official had stressed the need for "continuance of a strong armed neutrality" for Switzerland. 25X1

25X1 [REDACTED]

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The majority of the Swiss population and all political parties continue to pin their national security on neutrality and on their exaggerated opinion of the country's military capability. Nevertheless, certain ele-

The Swiss seem to feel that an early East-West war is unlikely now that the West has begun to re-establish the military balance of power, but they are perturbed over the slow progress of Western European rearmament and political unification. They believe that if war should break out in the near future, they have nothing to gain by exchanging their accepted status of neutrality for an alliance which they feel cannot guarantee their security. They hope to avoid involvement in any armed conflict by serving in their traditional **role** as intermediary between the belligerents. They feel that if the West does succeed in containing Communism, Switzerland will have benefited from that containment without having run the risks inherent in direct participation in such a program.

SPECIAL ARTICLE

## THE SOVIET ROLE IN THE KOREAN WAR

Portraying itself as the champion of "peace," the Soviet Union has taken considerable pains to conceal or deny official involvement in the Korean war. This has been manifested in the denials that Soviet troops were in Manchuria, or that an "International Volunteer Force" existed or that the USSR has the power to intervene with "sovereign" North Korean and Chinese governments.

It is well established, however, that the Soviet Union exerts the ultimate control over events in Korea. Truce talks were initiated shortly after the Malik proposal, and the negotiations were resumed in October after Ambassador Kirk's strong representations to Vyshinsky. [REDACTED]

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In contrast to Soviet protestations of peace, current intelligence shows very active Russian support, both in men and in materiel, of the Communist war effort in Korea. This support has taken the form of active participation, during almost the entire course of the war, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] estimated in mid-September that upwards of 15,000 Russians were physically involved in the Korean War. Only 2,000 of these were believed engaged in non-military pursuits. While no exact statistics are known on the scale of Soviet logistic support, a substantial amount of Russian materiel has been captured or destroyed, and the supply effort must be very large.

The major role played by Soviet personnel has been advisory. Each North Korean division is currently estimated by FECOM to have at least ten Soviet officers and five enlisted men, and Chinese Communist divisions may have a comparable group. [REDACTED]

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Soviet logistic support of Communist combatants in the Korean war has been substantial and continuous. Originally well-equipped with Soviet arms, the North Korean army lost most of this materiel and was completely re-equipped with greater emphasis on heavy weapons.

The Chinese Communist forces that entered Korea in October-November 1950 were equipped with a conglomeration of Chinese, Japanese, US and Soviet arms. By mid-summer of 1951, the Far East Command reported that the quantity of Soviet materiel in Chinese Communist hands had appreciably increased. During a 30-day period this fall the percentage of Soviet equipment captured from the Chinese Communists was as follows:

Small arms -- 66 percent  
Light automatic weapons -- 69 percent  
Machine guns -- 54 percent  
Mortars -- 23 percent  
Artillery -- 14 percent

Further evidence of this supply is seen in the destruction or capture by UN forces during the 18 months of the war of over 1,000 Soviet-manufactured armored vehicles. Despite these losses of armor, Communist forces in Korea now are estimated to have nearly 300 tanks, including the heavy Joseph Stalin tanks and self-propelled guns not heretofore encountered. The Soviet Union has furnished, at a minimum, sufficient equipment for 35 infantry and 7 armored divisions.

In the supply of aircraft, the Soviet Union has been prodigal. Communist China now has an air arm capable of giving its ground forces strong support, although unable to back up logistically its new-found strength. The Soviet Union has provided all the estimated 1,450 aircraft -- predominantly high performance jets -- now available to the Chinese Communist and the North Korean Air Forces, in addition to replacing combat and training losses which probably exceed 450 aircraft.

The UN Command claimed the destruction or capture of over 32,000 vehicles during the course of the war, and yet the Communist forces are able to maintain an estimated minimum of 10,000 trucks operating in North Korean rear areas. United Nations naval forces have destroyed over 1,100 Soviet-type mines during the course of operations to date.